Fundos de pensões: ah, pois é, bébé...

Pension Funds Still Waiting for Big Payoff From Private Equity

By JENNY ANDERSON, no The New York Times

Published: April 2, 2010

Private equity deal-makers, those kings of corporate buyouts, made billions for themselves when times were good. But some of their biggest investors, public pension funds, are still waiting for the hefty rewards they were promised.

The nation’s 10 largest public pension funds have paid private equity firms more than $17 billion in fees since 2000, according to a new analysis conducted for The New York Times, as the funds flocked to these so-called alternative investments in hopes of reaping market-beating returns.

But few big public funds ended up collecting the 20 to 30 percent returns that private equity managers often held out to attract pension money, a review of the funds’ performance shows.

Many public pension funds are struggling to recover from a collapse in the value of their portfolios, despite large private equity investments that were supposed to help cushion their losses.

Fees are at the center of the debate over the divergent fortunes of private equity managers and their investors, because fees often make a big dent in any investment gains.

That “raises the question as to why they accept to pay this level of fees,” said Oliver Gottschalg, a professor at the HEC School of Management in Paris who conducted the study on private equity fees.

State and local pension assets declined by 27.6 percent from the end of 2007 to the end of 2008, wiping out $900 billion, according to the Government Accountability Office.

Those poor returns have rankled some longtime private equity investors like the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, or Calpers. In September 2009, it “strongly endorsed” principles proposed by the Institutional Limited Partners Association, which represents private equity investors, to keep management fees in check and improve disclosure about fund performance.

The funds vary in how they report their performance and calculate their returns, allowing a significant number to classify themselves as “top quartile,” or the best performers.

“The fees paid to private equity managers has been a source of great frustration,” Joseph A. Dear, the chief investment officer for Calpers, said in an interview, adding that the managers “shouldn’t be making a profit on the management fee. They should make money when their investors make money.”

Still, despite the high fees, he said the funds’ performance had been good. “We don’t expect 20 percent,” he said. “We expect 3 percent more than public markets, net of fees.”

Private equity executives generally say their fees are justified by their market-beating returns. Reached by e-mail on Friday, Robert W. Stewart, a spokesman for the Private Equity Council, the industry’s trade association, declined to comment.

Public funds pay a lot of money to managers of so-called alternative investments like private equity, venture capital, real estate and hedge funds. In 2009, the Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement System paid $477.5 million in fees — 20 percent more than it did in 2008 and 283 percent more than in 2000, the earliest year for which data was available.

These funds generally charge fees totaling 2 percent of the money they manage and then take 20 percent of the profits they generate.

And yet, even after paying hundreds of millions of dollars in fees, the Pennsylvania fund is ailing. It lost more than a quarter of its value during its latest fiscal year and is now worth less than it was a decade ago, although its performance has improved recently.

(...)

Corrupção: EUA, Somália, Portugal

Moody's e Standard & Poor's processadas por notações corruptas.

Up to half the food aid in Somalia is diverted to corrupt contractors, local UN workers and Islamist militants, a leaked UN report says.

Porto sem verbas para combater a corrupção.

Um quinto das autarquias não entregou plano de prevenção da corrupção.

O combate à corrupção está na estaca zero, ou quase. Foi esta impressão que ficou no ar no final da audição parlamentar dos directores dos quatro DIAP (departamentos de investigação e acção penal), de Lisboa, Porto, Coimbra e Évora, deixaram queixas e propostas.

... A actividade do Conselho de Prevenção da Corrupção, que funciona no Tribunal de Contas, mereceu críticas da procuradora geral adjunta: "É um organismo estático que não interage com a investigação e que se alimenta de informações recebidas pelas autoridades".
"Faltam circuitos de prevenção e de detecção de crimes de corrupção em tempo real", acrescentou Maria José Morgado, para quem a "má organização e as más leis favorecem as oportunidades corruptivas" tal como "a promiscuidade entre funções públicas e privadas".
Para a directora do DIAP de Lisboa, "a política criminal é ineficaz, o modelo de investigação criminal está completamente ultrapassado, com uma sobreposição do ministério público sobre a polícia judiciária".

«A sociedade portuguesa tem excesso de corrupção, compadrio, de promiscuidades, e não estão apenas no espaço do Governo».

Estatísticas dos EUA

aqui.

EUA VS VIETNAME...desta vez na vertente económica!

Desde que me lembro que os Estados Unidos da América são a favor da desregulação dos mercados tanto a nível doméstico como a nível internacional. Nesse âmbito, através da leitura do livro “Making globalization work” de Joseph Stiglitz, constato que a ideologia, levada à prática, não é assim tão linear.

Como vem descrito no livro, o Vietname, em meados dos anos 90, começou a exportar peixe-gato para os EUA. Depressa o mercado norte-americano se tornou no melhor mercado externo para o Vietname, mais concretamente, as exportações vietnamitas deste produto detinham, na altura, 20% do mercado norte-americano. Os produtores norte-americanos não ficaram muito contentes e fizeram pressão para que o Congresso aprovasse uma lei que proibisse o peixe-gato proveniente do exterior de ser vendido com esse nome (catfish). Face a isto, o Vietname passa a exportar para os EUA o mesmo produto, no entanto, com o nome de Basa, que era conotado como sendo um peixe-gato de qualidade superior ao vendido pelos produtores norte-americanos e visto como um produto exótico estrangeiro. Desta vez, o produto vietnamita não estava apenas a “tirar” mercado aos produtores domésticos, estava também a ser vendido a um maior preço que anteriormente. A reacção dos EUA não se fez esperar, sendo desta vez, ainda mais agressiva, já que no falhanço de uma barreira não tarifária, usaram outra, acusando o Vietname de estar a vender abaixo do preço de custo, o denominado dumping.

Segundo Stiglitz, para um país impor uma medida anti-dumping pode usar como referência, não os custos de produção no país “réu”, mas sim os custos de produção de outro país à escolha. Devido a este paradigma, todas as medidas anti-dumping que um país desenvolvido impuser contra um país em desenvolvimento poderão ser confirmadas em tribunal já que os custos tendem a ser maiores nos países desenvolvidos que nos países em desenvolvimento (pelo menos neste caso). Para ser bem sucedido basta o país que quiser impor medidas anti-dumping usar como referência a estrutura de custos de um país que tenha elevados custos na produção do produto em causa.

Corrupção: chefe da polícia de Nova Iorque

O antigo chefe da polícia de Nova Iorque, Bernard Kerik, foi condenado em 18 Fevereiro a 4 anos de prisão por corrupção.

Kerik era chefe da polícia no mandato de Rudolph Giuliani, na altura dos atentados de 11 de setembro.

Confessou-se culpado e vai pagar uma multa de 187.931 dólares.

Evitou assim uma pena que podia ir aos 61 anos de prisão.

Kerik reconheceu ter aceite 255 mil dólares para a renovação do seu apartamento de uma sociedade que estava a disputar contratos governamentais.

Razões para cepticismo sobre a recuperação (Roach)

O Roubini pode ser o Mr. Doom, mas o Roach não pode/deve ser ignorado - até porque não lhe fica atrás.

There are four key reasons to remain skeptical about the vigor and sustainability of any rebound in the global economy:

First, the financial crisis itself is far from over. The latest International Monetary Fund estimates put the potential for worldwide writedowns of toxic assets at approximately $3.4 trillion; so far, realized markdowns have been only about half that amount. This points to further earnings impairments for financial institutions and concomitant restraints on their lending capacity.

Second, the breadth of this global recession was staggering. At its low point in March 2009, 75 percent of the world’s economies were contracting. Typically, the figure is closer to 50 percent. This means it will be much harder to turn around this recession-torn world.

Third, the demand side of the global economy is likely to be restrained by a protracted pullback of the over-extended American consumer. In the face of a massive labor market shock to jobs and wage earnings, together with the bursting of property and credit bubbles, the consumption share of the U.S. economy is likely to fall by five full percentage points of gross domestic product -- from its current record of 71.2 percent to the pre-bubble norm of 66 percent.

This should reduce trend growth of real consumption from the almost 4 percent pace of the pre-crisis decade to 1.5 percent to 2 percent over the next three to five years. No other consumer in the world is capable of filling this void.

Fourth, the supply side of the global economy suffers from massive imbalances, especially China-centric developing Asia. While, on the surface, post-crisis resilience of the Chinese economy has been impressive, it turns out that 95 percent of the 7.7 percent GDP growth realized in the first three quarters of 2009 was concentrated in the fixed investment sector, which already accounts for an unheard of 45 percent of GDP.

EUA: Mercado livre? Livre iniciativa? Pois...Pois... Digam isso a este insuspeito radical estatista

SIXTEEN months ago, our financial system teetered on the brink of collapse. The Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation took actions that were unpopular and previously unthinkable — but absolutely necessary to stave off an economic catastrophe in which unemployment could have exceeded the 25 percent level of the Great Depression.
...
Congress must pass financial regulatory reform. (...) Our overriding goal in restructuring our financial architecture should be that taxpayers never again have to save a failing financial institution.
(...)
First, we must create a systemic risk regulator to monitor the stability of the markets and to restrain or end any activity at any financial firm that threatens the broader market. Second, the government must have resolution authority to impose an orderly liquidation on any failing financial institution to minimize its impact on the rest of the system.

quem defende isto?

Henry M. Paulson Jr., the secretary of the Treasury from 2006 to 2009, [e] author of “On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System”, no The New York Times, do dia 15, no artigo "How to Watch the Banks", de onde veio também o 'boneco'.

Obama ao Congresso: 1.º, inovação...

ainda no Economic Report

(destaques meus)

For growth to be truly sustainable — for our prosperity to be truly shared and our living standards to actually rise—we need to move beyond an economy that is fueled by budget deficits and consumer demand. In other words, in order to create jobs and raise incomes for the middle class over the long run, we need to export more and borrow less from around the world, and we need to save more money and take on less debt here at home. As we rebuild, we must also rebalance.
In order to achieve this, we’ll need to grow this economy by growing our capacity to innovate in burgeoning industries, while putting a stop to irresponsible budget policies and financial dealings that have led us into such a deep fiscal and economic hole.
That begins with policies that will promote innovation throughout our economy. To spur the discoveries that will power new jobs, new businesses — and perhaps new industries—I have challenged both the public sector and the private sector to devote more resources to research and development. And to achieve this, my budget puts us on a path to double investment in key research agencies and makes the research and experimentation tax credit permanent.

(p. 7)

Obama ao Congresso: não ralha. Troveja! Excomunga!! Lança raios e coriscos!!!

(a imagem é de New Orleans)

(ainda a explorar o Economic Report of the President dos EUA ao Congresso. O texto assinado pelo presidente é seguido pelo The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, que é da autoria do presidente deste órgão, para o caso Christina Romer. O todo costuma ser de consulta obrigatória. Mais uma vez, os destaques no texto são meus)

um discurso extremamente duro.

...
But to understand where we must go in the next year and beyond, it is important to remember where we began one year ago.
Last January, years of irresponsible risk-taking and debt-fueled speculation—unchecked by sound oversight—led to the near-collapse of our financial system. We were losing an average of 700,000 jobs each month. Over the course of one year, $13 trillion of Americans’ household wealth had evaporated as stocks, pensions, and home values plummeted. Our gross domestic product was falling at the fastest rate in a quarter century. The flow of credit, vital to the functioning of businesses large and small, had ground to a halt. The fear among economists, from across the political spectrum, was that we could sink into a second Great Depression.
Immediately, we took a series of difficult steps to prevent that catastrophe for American families and businesses.
...
To achieve this, and to prevent an economic collapse, we were forced to use authority enacted under the previous Administration to extend assistance to some of the very banks and financial institutions whose actions had helped precipitate the turmoil. We also took steps to prevent the collapse of the American auto industry, ... Indeed, the decision to stabilize the financial system helped to avert a larger catastrophe,
...
More than 7 million jobs have been lost since the recession began two years ago. This represents not only a terrible human tragedy, but also a very deep hole from which we’ll have to climb out.
...
In recent years, spending bills and tax cuts for the very wealthiest were approved without paying for any of it, leaving behind a mountain of debt. And while Wall Street gambled without regard for the consequences, Washington looked the other way. As a result, the economy may have been working for some at the very top, but it was not working for all American families.
...
Beneath the statistics are the stories of hardship. I’ve heard all across America—hardships that began long before this recession hit two years ago. For too many, there has long been a sense that the American dream — a chance to make your own way, to work hard and support your family, save for college and retirement, own a home — was slipping away.
And this sense of anxiety has been combined with a deep frustration that Washington either didn’t notice, or didn’t care enough to act.
...
In addition, I’ve proposed a set of common sense reforms to prevent future financial crises. For while the financial system is far stronger today than it was one year ago, it is still operating under the same rules that led to its near-collapse. These are rules that allowed firms to act contrary to the interests of customers; to hide their exposure to debt through complex financial dealings that few understood; to benefit from taxpayer-insured deposits while making speculative investments to increase their own profits; and to take on risks so vast that they posed a threat to the entire economy and the jobs of tens of millions of Americans.

EUA: Uma ressaca maior que a bebedeira

A propósito do relatório económico anual do presidente dos EUA , que é sempre um grande - fisica e figuradamente - documento, repesquei esta parte, relativa à última aula de GC e ao gráfico lá em baixo:

The boom was fueled in part by irresponsible and in some cases predatory lending practices, risky investment strategies, faulty credit ratings, and lax regulation. When the boom ended, the result was widespread defaults and crippling blows to key financial institutions, magnifying the decline in house prices and causing enormous spillovers to the remainder of the economy.

(p.39).

Stiglitz - novo livro: Free Fall

Acaba de sair mais um livro de Stiglitz: Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.

O primeiro capítulo intitula-se The Making of a Crisis.

Começa assim:

The only surprise about the economic crisis of 2008 was that ir came as a surprise to so many. For a few observers, it was a textbook case that was not only predictable but also predicted. A desregulated market awash in liquidity and low interest rates, a global real estate bubble, and skyrocketing subprime lending were a toxic combination. Add in the U. S. fiscal and trade deficit and the corresponding accumulation in China of huge reserves of dollars - an unbalanced global economy - and it was clear that things were horribly awry.

E continua assim umas linhas depois:

The basic outlines of the story are well known and often told. The United States had a housing bubble. When that bubble broke and housing prices fell from their stratospheric levels, more and more homeowners found themselves "underwater". They owed more on their mortgages than what their homes were valued. As they lost their homes, many also lost their life savings and their dreams for a future - a college education for their children, a retirement in comfort. Americans had, in a sense, been living in a dream.

Mais:

Low interest rates and lax regulation fed the housing bubble. As housing prices soared, homeowners could take money out of their houses.

The economy was out of Kilter: two-thirds to three-quarters of the economy (the GDP) was housing related: constructing new houses or buying contents to fill them, or borrowing against old houses to finance consumption. It was unsustainable - and it wasn´t sustained. The breaking of the bubble at first affected the worst mortgages (the subprime mortgages, lent to low-income individuals), but soon affected all residencial real estate.
When the bubble popped, the effects were amplified because banks had created complex products resting on top of the mortgages. Worse still, they had engaged in multibillion-dollar bets with each other and with others around the world. This complexity, combined woith the rapidity with which the situation was deteriorating, and the banks' high leverage (they, like households, had financed their investments by heavy borrowing), meant that the banks didn't know wether they owed to their depositors and bondholders exceeded the value of their asset. The trust and confidence that underlie the banking system evaporated.

Para acabar a citação:

What would replace the unbridled consumption of Americans that had sustained the economy in the years before the bubble broke? How were America and Europa goin to manage their restructuring, for instance, the transition toward a service-sector economy that had been difficult enough during the boom?

Afinal, agora é que acaba:

How did it all happen? This is not the way market economies are supposed to work. Something went wrong - badly wrong.

angústias orientais de um ocidental

A implosão da China será antes ou depois da dos EUA?

para mais angústias e desassossegos, ler este excertozinho:

While the US Department of Defense continues to focus on the emerging threat of China as a conventional power and Goldman Sachs contemplates the exact date of China's emergence as the world's leading economy, another scenario is building steam: that China will implode.

o resto está aqui.